Poverty and corruption are the tow arms of war in Afghanistan

Rohullah rohani rohullah_rohani@yahoo.com

Beside Violence, drug production, public disapproval and casualties, we have another big problem in our country which influences our people life. We all accept that an uncorrupted social or economic transaction would be suspicious in its own way in our country. Most accounts of living or working in Afghanistan touch on corruption for a reason, while we are as exhausted by it as others are. Unfortunately it is more than the bribes offered to be seen sooner in a clinic, or those required getting access to appropriate and unexpired medicines, or those requested for an official’s signature on a cooperative agreement. It is actually the corruption of priorities that challenges the very core of what we should try to do. Corrupted decision-making processes, whether through intentional subversion of a more appropriate option or, more commonly, through the desire to influence an outcome for a tribe, family, clan, party, sect, or for monetary gain, keeps the health status of Afghans one of the lowest in the world. For Afghan people, corruption is particularly deadly. It leads to disease outbreaks and an (understandable) lowering of confidence.

Poverty is one of the main causes of corruption in Afghanistan and these tow causes strengthen the war and conflict. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, and the last few decades of war have seriously disrupted its mainly agricultural economy. The illicit opium trade which is the one economic activity now days in Afghanistan is widespread throughout. It is not only survived, but flourished, during and after the war. Now it accounts for more than half of GDP and is said to involve corrupt government officials at every level. Tribal warlords in south Afghanistan misuse the poor people for their own illicit business and control the poppy-growing areas, using the proceeds to fund their militias and arms purchases.

It seems that illegal or illicit trade and business spread in Afghanistan is also because of poverty. Unfortunately we could not expect the expansion of business and trade in a good way in Afghanistan which leads to richness of the poor people. Afghan market and economy are actually highly regulated by informal social norms that restrict competition and participation and ultimately result in a consolidation of market benefits in the hands of the already wealthy and powerful. The major traders in today’s market are the same ones who emerged in the 1970s and operated under the Mujahideen and the Taliban, often from Pakistan. They are a relatively small group of businessmen who dominate the sectors in which they are involved, having access to capital and political influence that small and medium-sized businesses do not. Most deal in many commodities within their region of operation, e.g. carpets, dried fruits and nuts, televisions and fertilizers — depending on price and demand — allowing an exporter of carpets to import televisions to get his money back into the country.

Corruption and collusion between government and business is believed to be commonplace. Business is conducted based on personal, familial, ethnic and historical relationships, and businesses must negotiate a maze of bribes, taxes and murky government requirements that raise the risks and costs of doing business. Those businesses with the right connections are able to sidestep many of these costs and risks. They are also more successful in getting access to land and capital, two critical constraints in the business enabling environment of Afghanistan. However, for small businesses and potential new investors or entrepreneurs without political influence, there are significant and sometimes insurmountable barriers to entry.

One of other main problem in Afghanistan is that Rural Afghans are extremely conservative and generally resistant to new ideas from the outside. The resistance seems to come from a combination of limited education, decades of isolation from modern advances, the necessity for extreme self-reliance to survive protracted periods of conflict, and the distrust, suspicion and presumption of corruption that permeates society after so many years of conflict. The other problem is that the officials and there cronies are, in many cases, at the center of the corruption. Earlier in the year, the reform drive seemed to be moving forward; the Obama administration was funding a massive anti-corruption program and training a cadre of Afghan investigators. Then, this summer, their wiretaps caught one of Mohammed Zia Salehi, soliciting bribes. He was arrested and thrown in jail—but then released. The New York Times' Mark Mazzetti and Rod Nordland report in today's paper that since that summer scandal, progress in several other corruption cases has screeched to a standstill.

The judicial branch is quite weak and regarded as corrupt. Property rights are a major constraint on business expansion. Land ownership is required as collateral for bank loans, and many people do not have title to the land they have occupied for generations. Other land has been appropriated by the military, police or government. Popular perception is that property rights are for sale by the government to insiders with influence. Thus acquiring land or the rights to use land for business purposes is regarded as a bureaucratic ordeal fraught with many risks, including that the government might grant title to land but then re-appropriate it after investments have been made. Whether this is actually a prevalent practice or not, the perception that it is seems to be a strong hindrance to new investments.

The weakness of the judicial organization makes the criminals feel safe, relax and unpunished; even, many of the worst offenders are now members of the current local, provincial or national administrations. This obviously can anger the population, sowing mistrust and bitter disillusionment that yet another corrupt, predatory regime has replaced the last. The Afghan National Police is part of the problem; ill trained and badly paid, they are notorious for preying on the citizens they are supposed to protect. Security is a problem throughout the country, and getting worse in the east and southeast. Insurgents attack the population, government and international peacekeeping forces. The police are widely seen as incompetent and corrupt, allowing criminal behavior to increase and perpetrating a fair amount of it themselves. Police, like bandits, are said to stop trucks hauling produce to market and order them to pay “taxes” and bribes before they can continue.

Finally it can be concluded that until government could not cut these powerful arms of war and conflict; peace couldn’t be reachable. Holding many conferences or jirgas and making tens of peace comities or councils couldn’t help us to reach peace and stability. The best way to get the peace is improving governmental abilities and atone the peoples trust by serving them honestly and diaphanously.

The challenge of democracy in Afghanistan

The father of modern sociology, Max Weber, pointed out that governments draw their legitimacy from three basic sources: traditional, religious, and legal. The first two are self-explanatory; by "legal," Weber meant Western-style democracies based on popular representation and the rule of law. But according to Afghan history demonstrates in the past legitimacy of governance there was derived exclusively from Weber's first two sources: traditional (in the form of the monarchy and tribal patriarchies) and religious. Either there has been a king, or religious leadership, or a leader validated by the caliphate (or afterwards by indigenous religious polities). In this case can we conclude that political failure in Afghanistan was baked into the cake in the 2001 Bonn Process? So it was a rush to stand up an overnight democratic success story, and the US and Europe overlooked Afghan history and finally was it a historical mistake?
May be we can prove our idea by giving some historical examples of leader ship and governance in Afghanistan. Often in Afghan history, legitimacy thus derived has been reinforced by other means, usually coercive and often brutal. For example, the rule of Amir Abdur Rahman, "The brute Amir," (1880-1901) and that of the Taliban (1996-2001) were predicated on accepted sources of legitimacy of governance (dynastic and religious, respectively), but reinforced by totalitarian methods. These two examples make the point that legitimacy should not be conflated with popularity: having the authority to rule is quite distinct from being a popular ruler. This historical reality poses a major problem for the US. Democracy is not a coat of paint. A feudal society in which women are still largely treated as property and literacy hovers below 10 percent in rural areas does not magically shortcut 400 years of political development and morph into a democracy in a decade. The current government of Afghanistan's claim to legitimacy is based entirely on a legal source – winning an election. Yet this has no historical basis for legitimizing Afghan rule. The winner of today's election will largely be seen as illegitimate because he is elected.
Some analysts may say that as same as An American cannot declare himself as a king and be seen as legitimate: monarchy is not a source of legitimacy of governance in America. Similarly, a man cannot be voted president in Afghanistan and be perceived as legitimate. Because Systems of government normally grow from existing traditions, as they did in the US after the Revolutionary War, for example. In Afghanistan, they were imposed externally. Representative democracy is simply not a source of legitimacy in Afghanistan at this point in its development. This explains in no small measure why a religious source of legitimacy in the form of the hated Taliban is making such a powerful comeback.
But these kinds of pessimistic ideas and opinions about Afghanistan could not be acceptable mow days in Afghanistan. We have a strong central government in Kabul which is genuinely seen as legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people and which has significant public support across the country's ethno-sectarian divides.Talking about positive developments we should focus just on the potential which existed there. Talking about the changes, we all are witness to the changes. The tragedies of September 11th and later on, action led by the United States, support from the people of Afghanistan in the resistance which existed there prior to September 11th against terrorism. The efforts of the international community as a whole led to the Bonn agreement later on, loyal jirga and formation of transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. This government was not the continuation of or did not start it as the continuation of another government in Afghanistan. It started from dealing with a country which was ruined for 30 years. It started from below zero. Our main priority was security, and it still is.
Overall, the security situation has improved throughout the country. It is talking about the security in a country that hasn't got a national police force, it hasn't got a national army, and other security institutions. The people of Afghanistan have turned against terrorism, the world has joined in a coalition, has started a campaign in Afghanistan against them. Afghan government is now working with its international partners in termination of national landmines. National formation of national police forces and National Judiciary Council is done. Humanitarian situation in some parts of the country is still in humanitarian phase or crisis, humanitarian crisis phase. While reconstruction activities have started, the people of Afghanistan, the people themselves they started before any other organization or any other country which is supportive of goverment efforts. Millions of school children have gone to school these years. Loya jirgas and elections were the process of democratic selection or election.
Afghanistan has been able to improve its relations with its neighboring countries with the hope looking towards the future, for a better future for our neighboring countries as well as Afghanistan. In that field Afghanistan has taken serious steps, important steps and historical steps. It is a fact that afghan neighboring countries will only benefit from a stable Afghanistan, their interest is in stability in Afghanistan, in a country which has a central government, a government which has got support from the people. In the past they had their own designs for Afghanistan, which didn't work, which has led to the disasters for our people, for our region, and worldwide. This is time to see the situation in the context of the new circumstances. Afghanistan relations with all its neighboring countries are good. the public policy of Afghanistan neighboring countries, Iran, Pakistan and the others, which is the support for the central government in Afghanistan.
Finally the most important issue which should be mention is the violation of law by some organizations and preference of tribal benefits to the national interests. In the case of parliamentary election results all organizations must support the decision of the independent election comity. Otherwise democratizing of Afghanistan
could not be possible.

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